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Abstract—Channel gains are frequently used to obtain a secret
key that can be used for encryption in physical layer security
systems. However, the channel gains captured by the nodes may
not always be the same due to channel estimation errors. This
would result in a non-zero key error rate (KER). In this letter, we
obtain theoretical expressions for KER in orthogonal frequency
division multiplexing systems. Tight KER approximations are
provided based on Gauss–Laguerre quadrature. A measurement-
based study is conducted by using software defined radio nodes
to demonstrate the validity and the practicality of the provided
results.
Index Terms—Key error rate (KER), physical layer security,
key extraction, physical layer key generation.
I. INTRODUCTION
W IRELESS medium has security vulnerabilities towardspassive attacks such as eavesdropping, due to its broad-
cast nature. A security solution against such attacks is to use
encryption/decryption mechanisms that rely on a bit sequence
referred to as the secret key [1]. This key needs to be avail-
able at the legitimate transmitter node and receiver node. Even
though encryption solutions can provide a reliable protec-
tion, generation of the key and maintaining its randomness
comes at a high cost of computational complexity. Key-sharing
algorithms such as Diffie-Hellman are frequently used for
this purpose [2]. Enabled by the channel reciprocity prop-
erty [3], physical layer (PHY) security techniques provide
a new perspective for key generation. This property relies
on the reversible nature of electromagnetic waves, ensuring
observation of similar channel gains (the amplitudes of chan-
nel coefficients) between two nodes. Spatially distinct users
encounter distinct wireless channel gains (or other character-
istics), that can be used to generate secret keys. This approach
is referred to as PHY key generation. The randomness of wire-
less channel provides continuous and unpredictably changing
key characteristics. PHY key generation is significantly less
complex than the classical key-sharing algorithms. In fact, it
merely introduces a quantization process as the channel needs
to be tracked for data communication in any case.
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Fig. 1. The system model. Using time division duplexing, Alice and Bob
generate the secret key based on the channel estimates. Estimation errors may
cause non-identical keys.
The basic secret key generation model is set between two
nodes, Alice and Bob. Each node uses PHY information to
generate a secret key. If their keys match, then they can
securely communicate. However, even one bit key mismatch
would disrupt communication. Therefore, bit error rate (BER)
becomes insufficient to measure the system performance and
the key error rate (KER) needs to be considered. Even in the
presence of reciprocal channels, the channel estimates in real-
life can be erroneous due to channel estimation error, leading
to non-zero KER values.
In order to properly assess the performance of PHY key
generation systems, KER needs to be accurately modeled.
With this objective, we consider the system model illus-
trated in Fig. 1. Both Alice and Bob will capture channel
coefficients possibly with some variations due to channel esti-
mation errors. We feed channel gains to a uniform quantizer,
as frequently used in [4]. Both nodes utilize the same quan-
tizer, with the quantization interval . Quantized gains can
be used to generate secret keys. Our proposed system consid-
ers raw key extraction which constitute a baseline for KER,
and can be reduced through information reconciliation. Our
contributions are:
• Theoretical KER expressions in presence of chan-
nel estimation error is derived considering complex
Gaussian channels. The results are extended to orthogo-
nal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) scheme that
is frequently used in current communication standards.
• Tight approximations to KER expressions are obtained by
using Marcum-Q functions and Gauss-Laguerre quadra-
ture (GLQ).
• Numerical results are given to verify the theoretical
expressions. The tightness of the provided approximations
are shown.
• Software defined radio (SDR) based tests are conducted
to demonstrate the validity and the real-life applicability
of the obtained KER expressions.
Related Works: As received signal strength (RSS) mea-
surements are already available in wireless devices, they are
frequently used to generate a secret key [5]. Another related
source for key generation is the channel gain [6]. Channel gain
is advantageous especially due to its simple acquisition (as in
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RSS) and rapid variations, improving the randomness of secret
keys. But the correlation between channel gains needs to be
carefully considered. In [7], the correlation between recipro-
cal channels are theoretically modeled. KER expressions are
not yet derived in the literature, and the majority of the avail-
able results depend on empirical measurements [8]. Phases of
the channel coefficients also show reciprocal characteristics,
but their acquisition requires complex systems that are tightly
synchronized.
Notation: X ∼ CN (ν, σ 2) refers to a random variable X,
which follows a complex Gaussian distribution with mean
ν and variance σ 2. · represents the floor function. erfc(·)
expresses the complementary error function. R ∼ R (ν, σ 2)
represents the Rice distribution for statistically independent
Y ∼ N(ν cos θ, σ 2) and Z ∼ N(ν sin θ, σ 2), where R =√
Y2 + Z2. When ν = 0 we obtain the Rayleigh distribution
R ∼ R (0, σ 2).
II. KEY ERROR RATE
We consider a two-way OFDM system composed of N
subcarriers. The channel estimates are obtained in a time divi-
sion duplex mode. As indicated in [7], in order to obtain
channel reciprocity, we assume that sampling time difference
between two nodes is smaller than the coherence time. As
in [9], we denote the parallel channel corresponding to the
nth OFDM subcarrier by Hn, for n = 0, . . . , N − 1. We con-
sider complex Gaussian channels, where Hn ∼ CN (ν, σ 2).
Despite the channel reciprocity assumption, Alice and Bob
may estimate channel coefficients in erroneous forms. Let the
estimated channel coefficient at Alice and Bob be respectively
represented by Hˆn,1 and Hˆn,2, where
Hˆn,k = Hn + en,k, (1)
for k = 1, 2. In the literature, the estimation error is modeled
as complex normal distributed, where en,k ∼ CN (0, σ 2e,k) [10].
Assuming a uniform quantizer with a step size , an estimated
channel gain |Hˆn,k| is mapped to the lth quantization interval
Il, where ln =
⌊ |Hˆn,1|

⌋
, and Il = [ln, (ln + 1)]. If both
estimates are located in the same interval, their decisions and
eventually key bits would be the same.
For a given estimate of the nth subcarrier’s channel at Alice
(Hˆn,1), the corresponding channel estimate at Bob becomes
Hˆn,2=Hˆn,1−en,1+en,2. In this conditional case, the amplitude
of Hˆn,2 follows Rice distribution with parameters |Hˆn,2| ∼
R (|Hˆn,1|, σ 2e ), where σ 2e = σ 2e,1 + σ 2e,2. Hence, we can obtain
the probability that |Hˆn,2| is located in Il interval as
Pl =
∫ (ln+1)
ln
x
σ 2e
e
− x
2+|Hˆn,1|2
2σ2e I0
(
x|Hˆn,1|
σ 2e
)
dx,
= Q1
(
|Hˆn,1|
σe
,
ln
σe
)
− Q1
(
|Hˆn,1|
σe
,
(ln + 1)
σe
)
. (2)
where, Pl represents the probability that the quantizer outputs
of the two estimated channel gains are the same for a given
Hˆn,1. I0(·) denotes the modified Bessel function of the first
kind and the first order Marcum-Q function is represented by
Q1(·, ·). If we denote the first estimated channel gain |Hˆn,1|
as y, the key matching probability for a single subcarrier, Pc,
becomes
Pc =
∫ ∞
0
[
Q1
(
y
σe
,
ln
σe
)
− Q1
(
y
σe
,
(ln + 1)
σe
)]
fY(y)dy,
(3)
where fY(y) denotes the probability density function (pdf)
of the corresponding channel model. Considering the com-
plete set of independently fading subcarriers, the key match-
ing probability becomes Po = PNc , and the KER becomes
KER = 1 − Po. For Rice distributed channel gains, where
Hn ∼ CN (ν, σ 2), the first estimated channel is modeled as
|Hˆn,1| ∼ R (ν, σ 2s ), where σ 2s = σ 2 + σ 2e,1. We obtain Pc
as given in Eq. (4), as shown at the bottom of this page. For
Rayleigh fading channel gains, we set ν = 0, where I0(0) = 1.
For notational convenience, let us define,
g(α, β1, β2, ν) = [Q1(α, β1) − Q1(α, β2)]e−
ν2
2σ2s I0
(
νασe
σ 2s
)
,
(5)
where α = y
σe
, β1 = lnσe , β2 = ln+σe . The difference in
Eq. (2) corresponds to g(α, β1, β2, 0) when ν = 0. In order
to provide a closed form approximation to the exact KER
expression in Eq. (4), we can use a tight approximation to
g(α, β1, β2, 0) as
g˜(α, β1, β2, 0) ≈
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 − e− (/σe)
2
2 α = 0, β1 = 0
1 − Q1(α, β2) α 	= 0, β1 = 0
Q1(α, β1) − Q1(α, β2) α 	= 0, β1 	= 0,
(6)
where β1 ≤ α < β2, due to the definition of the interval
Il. This closed form function depends on the condition of
whether one of the input values are zero [11]. Tight approx-
imations of Q1(α, β) can be conditioned on β ≤ α or
β ≥ α [12]. Therefore, we use two different tight approxima-
tions for Q1(α, β1) and Q1(α, β2) as shown in Eq. (7a) and
Eq. (7b), as shown at the bottom of this page, and replace the
Q1(·, ·) functions in g˜(α, β1, β2, ν) to obtain gˆ(α, β1, β2, ν).
The key matching probability for a single subcarrier can now
be expressed as
Pc =
∫ ∞
0
gˆ(α, β1, β2, ν)
y
σ 2s
e
− y2
2σ2s dy. (8)
Pc =
∫ ∞
0
[
Q1
(
y
σe
,
ln
σe
)
− Q1
(
y
σe
,
(ln+ 1)
σe
)]
y
σ 2s
I0
(
νy
σ 2s
)
e
− (y2+ν2)
2σ2s dy (4)
Q1(α, β) ≈
⎧
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1 −
√
2πβI0(αβ)
eαβ − e−αβ
[
1
2
erfc
(
α − β√
2
)
+ 1
2
erfc
(
α + β√
2
)
− erfc
(
α√
2
)]
β ≤ α (7a)
√
π
2
βI0(αβ)
eαβ − e−αβ
[
erfc
(
β − α√
2
)
− erfc
(
β + α√
2
)]
β > α (7b)
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Fig. 2. KER for different carrier numbers with respect to different K factors, (a) K = 0, (b) K = 1, (c) K = 20.
The GLQ can now be used to obtain a tight approxima-
tion to Eq. (8) as ∫ ∞0 e−ψ f (ψ)dψ ≈
∑M
m=1 wmf (ψm), where
wm = ψm
(M+1)2[L2M+1(ψM)]
. The degree of the polynomial, M,
denotes the number of considered terms. As M → ∞, the
approximation becomes an equality [13]. ψm represents the mth
root of the Laguerre polynomial LM(ψ). A change of variables
can be applied by defining y
2
2σ 2s
=ψ and y
σ 2s
=dψ , Hence KER
for N subcarriers can be obtained as
KER≈1 −
( M∑
m=1
wmgˆ
(√
2σ 2s ψm
σe
, β1, β2, ν
))N
. (9)
Here, , ν, σ , σe,1 and σe,2 are the critical parameters affect-
ing the KER value. A larger  would reduce KER, whereas
larger standard deviations of the channel estimation errors
(σe,1, σe,2), would increase KER.
III. NUMERICAL RESULTS
108 Monte Carlo iterations are run based on the theoretical
model expressed in Eq. (1). First, the non-zero mean com-
plex Gaussian reciprocal channel coefficients are generated.
Their gains follow Rice distribution. Different K-factor values
are considered, where K = ν22σ 2 . Then, estimation errors are
generated as zero mean complex Gaussian random variables
with standard deviations σe,1, σe,2. Erroneous channel esti-
mates are then quantized. Finally, assigned quantization levels
are considered as keys and the KER values are obtained.
As the channel estimate error variance could be more
dynamic in real-life, we consider a fixed  with varying σe
values, and observe the impact of 
σe
. It can be seen from Fig. 2
that KER decreases as this ratio increases. In addition to joint
estimation error, the σe,1
σe,2
ratio is an important factor. Nodes
of different capabilities (such as base stations or user equip-
ments) may have different channel estimation error variances
due to practical impairments, such as the noise figure in RF
amplifiers. To investigate a diverse set of use-cases, we con-
sider three different scenarios. In the first scenario, we consider
perfect channel knowledge at Alice while Bob estimates the
channel erroneously (σe,1
σe,2
= 0). In the second scenario iden-
tical nodes are considered (σe,1
σe,2
= 1), where, both Alice and
Bob estimate channel of equal quality. On the final scenario
(σe,1
σe,2
= 100), channel estimation error on Alice is more severe
than that of Bob. It can be seen that increasing σe,1
σe,2
negatively
affects KER. Another critical parameter is the K-factor of the
Fig. 3. SDR testbed for channel estimation and key extraction.
Rice channel. We select 3 different K-factor values as 0,1 and
20 to test KER, as shown in Fig. 2 (a), (b) and (c). As the
K-factor increases, lower /σe ratios enable the same KER
values. Simulation results are compared with the exact KER
expression (as KER = 1 − PNc ) in Eq. (4) and the approximate
closed form expression in Eq. (9) for varying K, σe,1, σe,2
and  values. For Eq. (9) we observe that M = 10 can tightly
approximate the KER expression. Lines show the approximate
KER by Eq. (9) while the circles indicate numerical estima-
tion from the exact expression in Eq. (4). The tightness of
the proposed approximations can be observed from the fig-
ures. While higher σe,1, σe,2 and σ values degrade the KER
performance, higher  and ν values reduce KER. The ratio
of the quantization interval to the joint channel estimation
error (σe) determines the robustness of the quantization against
estimation errors.
IV. TESTBED DESCRIPTION AND
MEASUREMENT RESULTS
USRP NI-2921 kits are used as SDR nodes in the test envi-
ronment, along with LabVIEW software. The testbed of the
implementation of point to point OFDM system is shown
in Fig. 3. 360 subcarriers are transmitted by using a dis-
crete Fourier transform of size of 480. The residual positions
are zero padded. Quadrature phase shift keying (QPSK) is
selected in tests, the carrier frequency is selected as 2.45 GHz.
Transmission rate is 1 MS/sec and the cyclic prefix length is set
to 120 samples. As the synchronization source NI PXI-6683
module is used. This module provides 10 MHz synchroniza-
tion clock source from a GPS receiver that is connected to
the master clock. The external clock signal is shared with
the transmitter and the receiver nodes over the cable. At the
receiver node, zero forcing approach is used for channel esti-
mation. The overall transmission of a packet is completed
in approximately 0.012 ms, consistent with the measurement
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Fig. 4. Distributions of |Hˆ1,1| and |Hˆ1,2|.
TABLE I
MEASUREMENT RESULTS
Fig. 5. Comparison of the obtained KER values.
studies in the literature to observe channel reciprocity [7], [14].
Keys are extracted every second. All subcarriers are used as
pilot symbols in order to avoid any additional channel estima-
tion error through the use of interpolation. As shown in Fig. 3,
USRP node Alice is used as transmitter and USRP node Bob
is used as receiver. Then, their roles are reversed. Transmission
on both ways is repeated 1000 times. The distance between
nodes is set to 50 cm.
Fig. 4 shows reciprocal channel gain histograms corre-
sponding to first subcarriers and their estimated pdfs. Their
distributions and K-factors slightly differ. The main reason
for this variation is the estimation errors on both sides, along
with the receiver front-end imperfections. The amplitudes of
the estimated channel gain coefficients are quantized and KER
values are measured for different  values. KER measure-
ments are compared with theoretical KER values from Eq. (9)
as given in Table I (where the channel estimation error vari-
ances are estimated as σe = 0.005 and (σe,1/σe,2 = 1). Due to
the distribution of the channel coefficients, the slightest change
in  affects KER significantly. The results show that KER
can be accurately estimated through the provided expression.
In order to test the validity of the proposed approach, recorded
coefficients are used as a reference for the system model given
in Section II. The K-factor shown in Fig. 5 indicates that
the reference channel gain estimates follow Rice distribution
(K = 1.31). We generate complex Gaussian estimation errors
and add them to recorded channel coefficients. Theoretical
KER values are compared with the obtained KER values
for the same set of parameters in Fig. 5. The slight differ-
ence between measurement and theoretical results are caused
due to the erroneous channel coefficients, captured during
transmissions. These results demonstrate the accuracy and the
practicality of the obtained KER expressions. The obtained
expression is critical to analyze the impact of the system
parameters. KER can be further reduced by using information
reconciliation techniques.
V. CONCLUSION
KER expressions are derived for complex Gaussian chan-
nels in presence of estimation errors. Theoretical expressions
are verified by simulations. SDR based measurements demon-
strate the applicability of the results.
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